Cultivating Ambivalence: Methodological considerations for anthropology by Kierans, C
2017 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 7 (2): 23–44
 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons  
| © Ciara Kierans and Kirsten Bell.  
ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau7.2.006
DEBATE
Cultivating ambivalence
Some methodological considerations 
for anthropology
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Anthropologists’ longstanding ambivalence toward political advocacy has, in recent years, 
come under sustained fire—a shift that is often framed in terms of the discipline’s “moral 
turn.” In this essay, we make a case for the value of ambivalence, asking what lessons it 
yields as a methodological heuristic. Tracing the history of the concept, we argue that 
anthropology was founded on an epistemological ambivalence regarding its orientation to 
social problems. Thus, the moral turn implies a fundamental transformation in the ways 
that ethnography is conceived. Although the possibility of conflating moral evaluation with 
anthropological interpretation is a recognized danger of this shift, we don’t believe that the 
problem can be resolved by being reflexive, or that all ethnographers confront it. Instead, 
we suggest that cultivating an analytic of ambivalence is our best strategy for understanding 
what is going on around us, and teaches us more about the character of social relations than 
prefigured moral stances can.
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  We learned that Boycott supporters felt silenced and intimidated by the anti-
Boycott sentiment in their departments while on the other hand anti-Boycott 
supporters felt silenced and intimidated by the Boycott sentiment in their 
departments.
 . . .
 We learned that everyone cared because turn out was at an all time high or 
 We learned that no one cared because only half the association votes
 . . .
 We learned the other side couldn’t see how far right it was unless
 The other side couldn’t see how far left it was.
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  The boycott was against anthropology’s commitment to relativism, tolerance, 
and dialogue and
 The boycott was part of anthropology’s commitment to social justice.
 . . .
  We learned we couldn’t talk because politics is when the time for talking is past 
and
  We learned we should have talked more because talking is what politics is. 
(Alex Golub 2016)
On June 7, 2016, 51 percent of members of the American Anthropological Associa-
tion (AAA) narrowly rejected a proposed academic boycott of Israeli institutions 
by 2,423 votes to 2,384. The decision to bring the vote to the AAA membership 
was an outcome of prior petitioning, debate, and deliberation. At the previous 2015 
AAA business meeting, the Israel–Palestine conflict had been the central focus 
of discussion, as a matter of critical concern for anthropologists and their com-
mitment to addressing contemporary social problems. What was at stake at this 
meeting and the subject of protracted discussion was not the nature of the Israeli 
occupation, but the particular strategies by which academic objections to it could 
best be pursued, that is, through boycott or dialogue.
Voting on the resolution to boycott Israeli academic institutions occurred the 
following spring over a six-week period. During this time, leading academics en-
gaged in advocacy and persuasion and argued their case: to boycott, or not. Many 
did so via insightful, impassioned, and thoughtful accounts, treating the issue in its 
complexity and highlighting its profound human importance. Others were rancor-
ous and moralizing, making evident the polarizing effect of the vote (see Hirschkind 
2016; Starrett 2016). The outcome and stance taken by the “anthropological com-
munity” was eagerly followed by activist groups and campaigners worldwide, turn-
ing professional concerns into very public matters.
What the heated discussions about the boycott and the final tally itself illus-
trated was the profound ambivalence within the anthropological community, won-
derfully captured by Alex Golub’s (2016) poetic reflection in the opening epigraph. 
Although some anthropologists were firmly positioned on one side or other of the 
divide, collectively we struggled to make up our minds—and many of us (including 
both authors) felt personally ambivalent about the boycott. While similarly wishing 
to exercise moral outrage at the systematic denigration of the Palestinian people, 
we were concerned that boycotts offer an oversimplification of events, which makes 
it difficult to engender solidarities across geopolitical fault lines. 
As leading anthropologists argued their cases in the run-up to the AAA vote, 
often conveying their own misgivings, we were led to reflect on the sense in which 
national boycotts of academic work constitute a response to the complexities of 
the situations in a particular society or nation-state. Few anthropologists would 
hold that states and societies can be treated as monoliths—that they can be read 
as single, unified entities—yet that is precisely what the proposed boycott asked us 
to do. We then asked to what extent the collective moral positions we have taken 
through the AAA vote were grounded in a firm understanding of the situations at 
hand: What does it mean for an anthropological community to take a moral rather 
than an analytical stance?
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Ambivalence arises as a product of taking stances. It is at the heart of attempts 
at position taking. As political theorist Alena Ledeneva suggests, it has its roots in 
bipolarity and can be understood through the paradoxes bipolarity produces: that 
is, the contradictory nature of constraints and the informal practices needed to 
resolve them (Ledeneva 2014b). The more we steer toward polarized understand-
ings, the easier it is to lose sight of the everyday ambivalences which underlie our 
ways of making sense of the world and acting upon it. Attending to the dilemmas 
posed by deciding “whose side we are on,” as the sociologist Howard Becker (1967) 
once put it, can alter the character of anthropology itself, fostering new “align-
ments” (Marcus 2008). It can reposition the objects of our interests as inherently 
and clearly moral, and, in so doing, set limits on our analytical possibilities. It can 
make invisible the intricacies of social practice and, to borrow from Bruno Latour 
(2005), mistreat matters of concern as matters of (moral) fact.
In this article, we extend recent interest in this journal in the concept of am-
bivalence and the study of contradictions (see Berliner et al. 2016; Jovanović 2016) 
to ask what lessons ambivalence, as a feature of everyday social practice, has for 
anthropology. We take up these questions by refocusing on the value of ambiva-
lence as a contemporary methodological heuristic. In what follows, we discuss the 
ways in which ambivalence has featured as a significant concept in the behavioral 
and social sciences generally and anthropology specifically. We then prepare a case 
for ambivalence via the “moral turn”’ in anthropology and two critical cases taken 
from our own research. We conclude by recasting ambivalence as a methodologi-
cal heuristic in anthropology, one which we argue has vital analytical significance. 
Locating ambivalence in fields of understanding
Outside of anthropology, social scientific explorations of ambivalence can be seen 
as following two distinct, albeit interrelated, paths: one, psychological; the other, 
sociological. In the psychological literature, ambivalence is broadly defined as 
“overlapping approach-avoidance tendencies, manifested behaviorally, cognitive-
ly, or affectively, and directed toward a given person, experience, or other object, 
as well as toward a set of objects” (Sincoff 1990: 43–44). It is typically seen to be 
an undesirable state—one that results in distress and/or an inability to make a 
decision (ibid.).
These negative connotations emerged as psychoanalysts developed the con-
cept. Although strongly associated with the work of Sigmund Freud, it was Eugen 
Bleuler who introduced the term into scientific parlance (Merton 1976; Sincoff 
1990). In a 1911 lecture on schizophrenia, he described ambivalence as one of its 
fundamental symptoms, differentiating between three primary types: volitional, 
intellectual, and affective. Volitional ambivalence relates to conscious conflicts, 
such as when someone both wishes and doesn’t wish to eat. Intellectual ambiva-
lence, on the other hand, is largely unconscious and primarily manifests itself 
linguistically—such as when an idea and a counteridea are expressed in the same 
sentence (e.g., “frenemy”). Finally, affective ambivalence involves simultaneous 
feelings of love and hate directed toward the same object; the example Bleuler pro-
vides is of “the husband both loves and hates his wife” (cited in Bleger 2013: 246). 
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Bleuler did not see ambivalence as intrinsically pathological. In his words, “Even 
for the healthy everything has two sides. The rose has its thorns. But in ninety-
nine out of a hundred instances, the normal person compares the two aspects, 
subtracts the negative from the positive values. He appreciates the rose despite 
its thorns” (cited in ibid.: 374). For Bleuler, the pathology occurred when these 
two perspectives were not synthesized: “The schizophrenic, with his weakened 
associative linkings does not necessarily bring the different aspects of a problem 
together. He loves the rose because of its beauty and hates it because of its thorns” 
(cited in ibid.).
Freud developed these ideas in his work on transference, although he focused 
exclusively on affective ambivalence (Sincoff 1990; Raulin and Brenner 1993). Al-
though Freud acknowledged that “ambivalence of feelings appears to be normal 
up to a point,” in his view “a high degree of it is certainly a special peculiarity of 
neurotics” (Freud [1912] 1958: 320). For Freud, ambivalence became pathological 
when the opposing feelings were equal in strength or when the emotion was par-
ticularly intense (Raulin and Brenner 1993).
Today, schools of psychoanalysis differ in the extent to which they character-
ize ambivalence as pathological, with object-relation theorists more likely to treat 
it as a healthy developmental achievement than a pathological response (Sincoff 
1990). Nevertheless, in light of its significance in the context of psychopathology 
and personality disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, depressive disorders, and obsessive-
compulsive personalities), it largely operates as something to be resolved or worked 
through. In Julie Sincoff ’s words: “Recognizing ambivalent conflicts and working 
towards resolution or acceptance of such conflicts thus constitutes a major psycho-
therapeutic task for clinicians and their patients” (1990: 48).
Ambivalence, however, is not a simply a problem of mind, a psychological “fact,” 
but also has its social counterparts and can therefore be understood as a social fact—
as Durkheim might hold. This line of analysis was taken up in the work of Robert 
Merton (1976). Merton introduced the concept of sociological ambivalence as com-
plementary to the notion of psychological ambivalence. Arguing that “the facts of 
ambivalence have been regarded chiefly or wholly in their psychological aspects” 
(ibid.: 4), he aimed to make the structure of social relations, and its role in producing 
ambivalence, the focus of sustained analysis. His chief interest was in the “ways in 
which ambivalence comes to be built into the structure of social statuses and roles” 
(ibid.: 5)—understood in terms both of the processes that affect the probability of am-
bivalence occurring and of the consequences of such ambivalence for the workings 
of social structures. Ambivalence reflects the contradictory demands placed upon 
people in society, signifying the importance of dualism, contradiction, and paradox 
for social analysis. These consequences Merton saw in primarily negative terms. 
However, because the conflicts produced were rooted in the social structure 
rather than the individual psyche, they couldn’t necessarily be conquered or re-
solved. Although this exteriorized view of ambivalence as a “problem” to be diag-
nosed (and solved), one having psychological undertones, has indelibly marked the 
ways we discuss and use the concept in anthropology and sociology (Nedelmann 
1998), several analyses have presented us with more complex and nuanced per-
spectives. In these accounts, ambivalence is portrayed as something produced by 
(and productive of) our orientation to the social world, rather than constituting an 
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explanatory device in and of itself. This distinction, which can be subtle, is critical 
to the argument of this article. 
Zygmunt Bauman’s Modernity and ambivalence (1991) is an ambitious attempt 
to grapple with the transition from the modern to postmodern condition, which 
he suggests is characterized by greater social fragmentation and, as a result, greater 
tolerance for ambivalence. We are not interested in pursuing this broader line of 
argument here; however, where we see Bauman’s work as relevant is in his obser-
vations about ambivalence as a byproduct of the drive toward order and classi-
fication. Classification is premised on the assumption that the world consists of 
discrete entities that are opposed to other entities; its logic is that of inclusion and 
exclusion—of bifurcation and dichotomization. It thus seeks to eradicate ambiva-
lence by its ordering and structuring practices. But “the application of such criteria, 
and the very activity whose progress they are to monitor, are the ultimate sources 
of ambivalence” (ibid.: 7). That is to say, ambivalence is produced by the very same 
processes that seek to overcome it. The drive to eradicate ambivalence is therefore 
both self-perpetuating and self-defeating. 
These dual qualities of ambivalence as something that simultaneously advances 
and defeats fixity are illustrated in Homi Bhaba’s (1984) work on mimicry and co-
lonial discourse. Bhabha argues that mimicry is a mode of colonial discourse that 
desires the production of a “reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of difference 
that is almost the same, but not quite” (ibid.: 126, emphasis in original). Thus, the dis-
course of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence: “In order to be effective, 
mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference” (ibid., em-
phasis added). But this double vision means that mimicry has the potential to dis-
rupt the authority of colonial discourse even as it aims to reproduce it. Again, we see 
the ways in which ambivalence destabilizes the very categories it is premised upon. 
This destabilizing force of ambivalence is also recognized within the science 
and technology studies literatures (Singleton and Michael 1993), undermining 
both the hubris and determinism often associated with scientific innovation and 
development. New technologies such as nanotechnologies, advanced reproduc-
tive technologies, and transplant medicine are often imagined by both scholars 
and the public in relation to their good or bad effects on the world: their capaci-
ties to liberate or enchain (Rabinow 1996; B. S. Turner 2007). This is particularly 
evident in feminist ambivalences toward plastic surgery, simultaneously con-
ceived of as a powerful tool for and against women, “desirable and problematic” 
(Davis 1995: 180). 
These bifurcations are, of course, not written into the technological forms 
themselves; nor are they a consequence of them, making oscillations between opti-
mism and pessimism analytically unproductive (Wajcman 2004). Technologies, as 
Marianne de Laet and Annemarie Mol (2000) artfully show in their writing on the 
Zimbabwe bush pump type B, are intrinsically ambivalent as to their effects—to 
their being loved or despised. It is instead our orientations to them, the complex 
social relations within which they are embedded, and, from this, the social con-
texts within which they are made to work or fail, which produce their effects upon 
the world. In other words, this complex social ground provides the conditions of 
and for ambivalence, and is no less a feature of anthropological scholarship and its 
technologies of knowledge production than it is of de Laet and Mol’s water pump. 
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Ambivalence and anthropology
As the response to the proposed AAA boycott of Israeli institutions suggests, there 
is a considerable degree of ambivalence about the relationship between anthro-
pology and political advocacy. This ambivalence speaks to two very different ori-
entations to the discipline—differences that crystallize in a comparison of several 
papers published in the 1990s on anthropology and advocacy. 
In an article titled “Anthropological advocacy: A contradiction in terms?,” 
Kirsten Hastrup and Peter Elsass argued that
advocacy, as such, is incompatible with anthropology as a distinct kind 
of scholarship. To be advocates anthropologists have to step outside their 
profession, because no “cause” can be legitimated in anthropological 
terms. Ethnographic knowledge may provide an important background 
for individual advocacy for a particular people, but the rationale for 
advocacy is never ethnographic; it remains essentially moral in the 
broadest sense of the term. (1990: 301)
Less than a year later, Orin Starn (1991) made precisely the opposite plea. With 
reference to Andean anthropology, he pointed to the ways in which ethnographers 
often mentioned the high rates of infant mortality, minuscule incomes, poor life 
expectancy, inadequate diets, and so on, only in passing, choosing instead to repro-
duce a “Andeanist” variant of Orientalism that focused on ceremonial exchanges, 
weddings, baptisms, and so on, and highlighted continuities with a precolonial 
past. He concluded: 
Active anthropological work for life and peace ought, I believe, to 
accompany the break from Andeanism. If the effects may be small, our 
efforts can at least help to bring Peru’s situation to public attention and 
to build pressure on the Peruvian government to respect human rights. 
(1991: 86)
In sum, for Hastrup and Elsass, advocacy was fundamentally unanthropological; 
for Starn, advocacy was anthropologically necessary—a critical means of undoing 
the damaging anthropological representations of Andeans.
A similar debate played out a few years later with a slight change in person-
nel. In 1995, Nancy Scheper-Hughes presented her proposal for a “militant” an-
thropology. Citing Starn, she argued that it was untenable for anthropologists 
to continue to position themselves as above and outside the human events they 
recorded. Instead, she advocated a view of the anthropologist as “a responsive, 
reflexive, and morally committed being, one who will ‘take sides’ and make judg-
ments” (ibid.: 419). To do otherwise, she suggested, was to collaborate with “the 
relations of power and silence that allow the destruction [of dominated peoples] 
to continue” (ibid.: 319).
In a response to the piece, Roy D’Andrade (1995) raised a number of concerns 
about the growing emphasis on anthropology as a moral discipline that contained 
explicit moral judgments about the world. Differentiating between a “moral mod-
el” and “objective model” of anthropology, he interrogated the assumptions under-
pinning the former. Singling out its inability to provide an adequate representation 
of the world, its underlying ethnocentrism, and its implicit objectivism, D’Andrade 
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argued that “anthropology can maintain its moral authority only on the basis of 
empirically demonstrable truths” (ibid.: 408).
It is tempting to characterize these differing assessments largely as evidence of a 
generation gap, with Hastrup, Elsass, and D’Andrade standing in for the old guard 
and Starn and Scheper-Hughes standing in for the new. Indeed, the position of 
Hastrup and Elsass and of D’Andrade now appears a little dated and naïve, seeming 
to draw on an ideological separation between “facts” and “values” that the post-
modern, postcolonial, poststructuralist turn decisively shattered (see Pels 1999). 
In recent years, anthropologists have answered Starn’s and Scheper-Hughes’ 
criticisms by providing an expansive corpus of studies—critical and applied in 
character—on what we might broadly refer to as social problems, which we will go 
on to discuss shortly. However, in our view, it would be a mistake to represent these 
debates as particularly new. In fact, we want to suggest here that they speak to an 
epistemological ambivalence built into anthropology—one that was foundational to 
the discipline’s formation and professionalization.
Peter Pels has argued that anthropology’s morals are essentially duplex: “With-
out duplicitous intent or moral corruption, anthropologists cannot but adopt 
‘double standards’” (1999: 102). It was such duplexity—and the ethical and epis-
temological doubling it entailed—that enabled anthropologists to simultaneously 
serve and distance themselves from the colonial administrations that both facili-
tated and were the primary consumers of anthropological research. 
Pels argues that the process of anthropological professionalization was intimate-
ly tied up with an attempt to distance the discipline from its prior problem-oriented 
agenda in service of the colonial enterprise. This took the form of “a morality of 
representation: the argument that only a disinterested, noninterventionist attitude 
in the field could reduce the duplexity of fieldwork and lead to an adequate knowl-
edge of the colonized” (ibid.: 108). But Pels observes that the morality of represen-
tation could work out in two seemingly contradictory ways: as a commitment to 
practical relevance and as “pure” scientific detachment. This is thus the basis for 
anthropology’s ambivalent relationship to championing social causes and solving 
social problems.1 
It is this ambivalence that propelled early disciplinary discussions about the 
merits of applied anthropology (see Evans-Pritchard 1946) and later questions 
about the possibility of a “feminist ethnography” (see Stacey 1988; Abu-Lughod 
1990). More recently, it has informed debates about the precise role and contribu-
tions anthropology can make under the mantle of “public anthropology” (Borofsky 
2000), which has developed alongside debates about “public sociology” (Burowoy 
1. However, it’s not clear that all anthropologists experienced this ambivalence equally—
or at least not in the same way. Franz Boas exemplifies an anthropologist whose po-
litical and scientific commitments were firmly wedded in his work. For example, in 
a much-cited passage at the end of The mind of primitive man, he noted: “I hope the 
discussions outlined in these pages have shown that the data of anthropology teach us 
a greater tolerance of forms of civilization different from our own, that we should learn 
to look on foreign races with greater sympathy” (1911: 278). Nevertheless, he arguably 
saw his scientific work as intellectually separable from his advocacy efforts, whilst si-
multaneously aware of how they informed each other.
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2005) and “militant anthropology” (Scheper-Hughes 1995). However, the stand-
points adopted suggest a concern not only for the anthropologist as advocate but 
also for the transformative potential of anthropology itself (Osterweil 2013). In 
what follows, of particular interest to us is the growing insistence that anthropo-
logical work requires a more pronounced moral compass. 
Prefiguring engagement: Social problems and the “moral turn”
Didier Fassin (2008, 2012) observes that moral indignation has become a major 
influence on the choice of topics that anthropologists study. In his words: 
Two or three decades ago, anthropologists did not work on violence and 
suffering, trauma and mourning, prisons and camps, victims of wars and 
disasters, humanitarianism and human rights. These realities existed 
but received little attention from the discipline. Other objects, whether 
kinship or myths, witchcraft or rituals, peasantry or development, were 
seen as more relevant for the understanding of human societies. This 
transformation of our gaze and of our lexicon has been accompanied 
by frequently more engaged positioning. Such a remarkable evolution 
raises the question of why we were unaware of or indifferent to the tragic 
of the world before and, symmetrically, why we became so passionately 
involved in it in recent years. (Fassin 2012: 5) 
Fassin thus points to a moral hierarchy of legitimate objects of anthropological re-
search that increasingly dictates what anthropologists study and how (Caduff 2011). 
Although Fassin suggests this development is specific to the discipline, Kirsten 
Bell (in press) has elsewhere suggested that the so-called “moral turn” might be bet-
ter read as an instrumental one that is evident well beyond the confines of anthropol-
ogy. For example, Marilyn Strathern (2005) has highlighted the ways that “society” 
had increasingly been drawn into the scientific enterprise as a key “stakeholder.” 
This, she suggests, has encouraged “problem-oriented, task-specific, research-to-
find-solutions types of questions” (ibid.: 13). The net result is that academics from all 
disciplines are expected to focus on research that contributes in a direct way to solv-
ing social, economic, and cultural challenges and problems (Dehli and Taylor 2006). 
As Bruce Kapferer has observed, “The major problem with some views concerning 
new developments in anthropology and cognate disciplines is a failure to examine 
them against processes occurring in the wider global political scene” (2000: 175). 
Regardless of the forces driving the shift in focus, it’s nevertheless clear that 
certain topics are increasingly morally prefigured in terms of how anthropolo-
gists—and others—are expected to engage with them. We therefore agree with 
Fassin’s concerns about the analytical constraints that moral positions can and do 
impose, although this point is far from new, having repeatedly reared its head in the 
longstanding disciplinary debates about anthropologists’ orientation to advocacy. 
Where Fassin differs from earlier commentators is in his view that anthropological 
research is inherently moral. In his words, “All human activities are grounded on 
moral assumptions” (2012: 5); therefore, “we have to live with it” and “work on it” 
(2008: 342).
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We are less convinced that anthropological research is unavoidably moral—un-
less morality is treated as synonymous with “values.” This is precisely the position 
Fassin takes, as he continually speaks of “moral positions” and “value judgements” 
in the same breath, in what amounts to a conceptual collapse of both terms (e.g., 
ibid.: 337, 341). Indeed, he explicitly avoids defining the term “moral,” justifying 
this via recourse to the lack of philosophical agreement on its meaning and “be-
cause for social scientists there is a benefit from proceeding in this inductive way” 
(Fassin 2012: 6). However, it seems to us that more specificity is necessary, because 
while all research may be value laden, it is clearly not all morally driven—as Fassin 
himself observes, the moral indignation that increasingly characterizes anthropo-
logical research is relatively new. 
Here, the early work of the anthropologists Abraham and May Edel is useful 
in articulating the differences between values and morals.2 In Anthropology and 
ethics, they observed that in some respects “we all know what we are talking about 
when we talk about morality,” but went on to ask: “By what mark shall we know 
‘the moral’?” (1959: 7). In their account, morality is somewhat akin to pornography 
insofar as we might all know it when we see it (to paraphrase the famous quote by 
US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart), but we don’t all have the same view of 
what it is. 
Edel and Edel argued that there was considerable diversity in how the mark of 
the moral was assigned, and highlighted two distinct conceptual variants: “Ethics 
Wide” and “‘Ethics Narrow.” Ethics Wide “assumes that moralities are part and par-
cel of the whole field of human endeavor and striving” (ibid.: 8). In this framing, 
human “values” writ broad are of interest; these values might be explicitly moral, 
or they might be those that play an organizing role in society, or they “may have no 
particular unity beyond some broad servicing role in the achievement and main-
tenance of fundamental individual and social well-being” (ibid.: 9). In contrast, 
Ethics Narrow limits the scope of inquiry into moral phenomena by emphasizing 
the notion of duty or obligation. In Edel and Edel’s words, “Values, it says, are far 
too broad, far too promiscuous. Only those that ought to be or ought to be realized 
come within the scope of morality” (ibid., emphasis in original). 
Although Edel and Edel suggest that Ethics Wide is too broad and Ethics Nar-
row is too confined to suit the task of the comparative study of morals, Signe Howell 
(1997) points out that Ethics Wide effectively becomes a stand-in for the concept 
of “culture.” Likewise, the problem with Fassin’s definition of moral anthropology 
is that potentially anything and everything is included in its scope (Bell in press). 
In our view, this has the effect of disguising what is distinctive about the newly 
moral(istic) variant of anthropology. In fact, it seems to us that this is precisely 
what some of the earlier critics of the moral turn in anthropology were primarily 
concerned about, although they are often represented as naïvely clinging to an out-
dated ideal of scientific detachment and objectivity.
For example, despite the seemingly dated contrast D’Andrade (1995) draws 
between an “objective” and “moral” model of anthropology, he doesn’t claim that 
2. Although they muddy the waters slightly by treating “morals” and “ethics” as synonyms. 
This is a common tendency, albeit one that Quetzil Castañeda (2006) challenges on 
conceptual grounds.
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anthropology is value-free or that the purposes to which it is put are always benign. 
Instead, his concern is with the rise of an overtly moral version of the discipline 
that aims “to identify what is good and what is bad and to allocate reward and 
punishment”3 (ibid.: 399, emphasis in original). If, as Fassin himself notes, “moral 
discourse evaluates, judges, sanctions” (2008: 339), then clearly not all anthropo-
logical discourse is moral in this specific sense, because its goal is understanding 
rather than evaluation. Thus, there is clearly a qualitative difference in the ways 
that anthropologists write about certain topics in comparison to others—as we 
have frequently had cause to witness in our respective work on tobacco and organ 
transplantation. 
Unpicking the moral imperative
Today, it has become a truism that cigarettes are the only legal product that “kills” 
at least one third of all users. Implicit in this framing is the tobacco industry’s cul-
pability in producing a lethal and highly addictive product—a view that is captured 
in a plethora of books with titles like Merchants of death: The American tobacco 
industry, Peddling poison: The tobacco industry and kids, and Golden holocaust: 
Origins of the cigarette catastrophe and the case for prohibition and films like The 
insider.
Such representations are unquestionably related to the tobacco industry’s long 
history of obfuscating the harms of its products and its repeated attempts to im-
pede efforts to regulate them. However, they have also served to construct tobacco 
use as a quintessentially moral “problem”—one in which the “bad guys” (the to-
bacco industry) and the “good guys” (tobacco control) are arrayed at the outset and 
our orientation to the subject matter has been essentially preordained.
Because the starting point is the undesirable character of tobacco use and the 
tobacco industry’s responsibility for its uptake, this framework “promotes an un-
derstanding of tobacco use that makes reference to the tobacco user and his/her 
practices analytically redundant” (Mair and Kierans 2007: 107). After all, the an-
swer to the question of why people smoke is assumed from the outset. As Simone 
Dennis (2016: 13) observes, “The ‘why people smoke’ question is almost invariably 
asked in the service of the ‘how can it be stopped?’ question; the question is, in 
other words, asked to generate an answer useful to the project of smoking cessa-
tion.” In effect, tobacco research “proper” becomes defined by its commitment to 
ending the global tobacco “epidemic”—or, at the very least, its capacity to resist 
appropriation by the tobacco industry (Mair and Kierans 2007). The end result is 
that tobacco research becomes largely instrumental in function (ibid.; Bell 2013; 
Bell and Dennis 2013; Dennis 2016). 
3. Half a century earlier, Evans-Pritchard (1946: 92) made essentially the same point, not-
ing: “It is surely not required of an anthropologist that he have no moral values or shall 
refrain from using them in situations which demand an ethical standard. What is ob-
jectionable is for an anthropologist to allow his particular philosophy to determine his 
observations, to influence his deductions, and dictate his problems within the field of 
his own science.” 
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A radically different domain which produces similarly polarized points of de-
parture across various fields of understanding is that of organ transplantation. 
From a medical perspective, organ transplantation is largely constructed as a pub-
lic good: the “optimum” treatment for end stage kidney disease, a “gift” of life, 
the heroic outcome of valiant surgeons, and so on. Such institutionalized narra-
tives have, as Margaret Lock (2002) suggests, been fundamental to the stabilization 
and public acceptance of transplant medicine, to how it has taken root with little 
opposition. 
Those, however, with an interest in the social relations and mechanisms of 
exchange on which transplant medicine depends have sought to recast the trans-
plant story in much less positive terms. From popular fiction (e.g., Frankenstein, 
Coma, Flatlander, Never let me go) to film (e.g., The awful Dr. Orloff, The brain that 
wouldn’t die, Seven pounds, Dirty pretty things) to anthropological research to bio-
ethical debates, various social and cultural responses to transplant medicine have 
raised a whole host of concerns (Kierans 2011, 2015). These range from organ sell-
ing, stealing, and trafficking, to medical malpractice, the deleterious consequences 
of human experimentation, and the ethics bound up with using brain and cardiac 
death criteria to support deceased organ donation. 
While there are many of bodies of research across the social sciences which take 
a more nuanced approach to this domain, the temptation has been to attend to this 
subject matter through its extreme forms (signs of utopian or dystopian futures), 
and then to read organ transplantation as inherently exploitative and capitalistic in 
character (Kierans 2011, 2015). As a result, perspectives on transplant medicine are 
riven by moral position taking and juxtaposition: utopian futures sit alongside dys-
topian fears, medical valor alongside corruption, care alongside exploitation. These 
contrasting positions insinuate not only that there are sides to be taken, but that 
these sides are unproblematic: Who could be against the importance of life-saving 
technologies? Similarly, who could be for organ trafficking and the exploitation 
and mutilation of poor bodies? But assuming such moral positions obscures the 
complex social relations, conditions, and contexts which ground transplant medi-
cine and, in turn, treats the important contributions anthropology can make to an 
understanding of this issue as anthropology—rather than moral philosophy—as 
of only secondary importance. We are presented with arguments about which side 
to take but we are not helped to arrive at a better understanding of what sides are 
being taken on. Instead, a moral commitment to viewing things in a particular way 
from the outset becomes the foundation for further inquiry.
Despite their differences, both topics share a tendency for anthropologists to 
take on the role of moral arbiter. Thus, it seems to us that characterizing all an-
thropology as driven by moral impulse serves to dilute and elide the larger issue—
which is that the terms of engagement with some topics have been foreclosed and 
some kinds of conversations have been shut down, effectively limiting our grasp of 
such phenomena. For example, when we reduce tobacco use or organ transplanta-
tion to discourses of exploitation, what have we learned about the nature of smok-
ing or indeed its promotion, or the practices and contexts from which medicine is 
practiced? We have only explicated part of the problem. While it is easy to refer to 
specific practices bound up with each as abominations, does calling something an 
“abomination” make us any more attuned to the nature of the problem at hand? 
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At this point, it is important to be clear that we are neither condoning nor turn-
ing a blind eye to unscrupulous practices, but concerned about the role of explicit 
moral positions as academic points of departure and their capacity to shape the 
critical ground of our research. Operating from moral starting points, as opposed 
to understanding them as subjects to be explicated, far too easily sets up orthodox-
ies and symmetries, generating normative assessments that can only take us into 
analytical culs-de-sac. Worse still, they impose false simplicities, where the agency 
of others is suffocated, and our chief protagonists, the “good” and “bad” guys, be-
come social caricatures or “dopes” (Garfinkel 1967) passively following prescribed 
cultural scripts.
In her much-cited essay “Can the subaltern speak?,” Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(1988) attends to this problem by emphasizing those aspects of history and ideol-
ogy that obstruct and obscure the possibility of being heard for those who inhabit 
the periphery. In doing so, she also provides a sobering reminder that the critical 
ground of analysis is not the special preserve of the academic researcher alone, but 
exists as local idiom, part of everyday lives and responses of others to social prob-
lems. In similar fashion, Dorothy Smith (2004: 446) marks the distinction between 
ideology and science as the difference between treating concepts as “the primitives 
of theory and treating them as sites for exploring the social relations that are ex-
pressed in them.” Drawing from the writings of Marx and Engels, she emphasizes 
the importance of locating our scientific efforts within the practical activities of real 
individuals—the everyday, the seen-but-un(re)marked—as the concrete ground of 
research. According to Marx and Engels, 
The premises from which we begin are, therefore, not arbitrary ones, 
not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made 
in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the 
material conditions under which they live, both those which they find 
already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can 
thus be verified in a purely empirical way. (Cited in D. Smith 2004: 449)
What Spivak and Smith orient our attention to, as with Marx and Engels before 
them, is that the objects of social inquiry are always governed by the practical 
ground of everyday activities and not already abstracted a priori points of depar-
ture, readily cast as ideology, dogma, or moral standpoints. 
It’s worth recalling that this emphasis on the “practical activities of real individ-
uals as the concrete ground of research” was historically the starting point for the 
ethnographic method (e.g., Malinowski 1922; see also Nader 2011). What differ-
entiated anthropology from other social sciences was the ethnographic imperative 
and the “primacy given to the ethnographic over the conceptual, interpretational or 
the abstract-theoretical” (Kapferer 2007: 81). Thus, the moral turn is a clear depar-
ture from this starting point; indeed, it provides the foundation of a new starting 
point. Operating thus, we agree with Fassin that anthropologists should see moral-
ity (in its more delimited evaluative sense) as a site of social practice and explicate 
it, rather than take it for granted. Instead of simply acting out of the imperative to 
weigh in, we need to ask ourselves what is going on. It is very easy to fall into the 
trap of taking sides on taking sides, where the “good guys” in the social sciences are 
the ones who know which side to be on and the “bad guys” don’t take sides at all. 
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Fassin (2008, 2012) argues that the moral turn in the discipline thus requires a 
more demanding methodology that forces us to become more conscious and criti-
cal of our own moral presuppositions. This, he suggests, will help us to respect the 
epistemological grounds of our work whilst simultaneously preserving its political 
engagements. In other words, it helps to avoid the trap of conflating anthropologi-
cal interpretation with moral evaluation. But Fassin is vague on what this more de-
manding methodology might entail, beyond general exhortations about the need 
to consider “moral reflexivity as part of our research activity” (2008: 341; see also 
2012: 4). 
As Michael Lynch (2000: 26) has observed, while reflexivity is increasingly be-
ing held up as a “methodological virtue and source of superior insight, perspicacity 
or awareness,” it’s often difficult to establish just what is being claimed. He points 
out that contemporary injunctions to “be reflexive” presuppose that reflexivity does 
something. The underlying assumption is that reflexivity has a kind of critical po-
tency and emancipatory potential that transforms a previously unreflexive condi-
tion into something more progressive. However, as Lynch argues, what reflexivity 
does, what it reveals, what it threatens to expose, and whom it empowers ultimately 
depends upon who is doing it and how they go about it. Indeed, in a basic sense, 
all research is reflexive, regardless of its political and methodological aspirations. 
Lynch (ibid.: 46) concludes that when we recognize the lack of a single coher-
ent division between reflexive and unreflexive discourse, “reflexivity loses its meta-
physical aura and (apparent) ideological potency for empowering theories and 
rallying movements.” Thus, reflexivity in general offers little guarantee of insight 
or revelation. Viewed in this vein, the “moral reflexivity” Fassin advocates is hardly 
an antidote to the tendency to conflate analytic and normative assessments. On 
that basis, rather than train our critical attentions inward to the reflexivities of the 
researcher as a means to resolve moral positioning, we advocate, via the prism of 
ambivalence, the need to direct our attentions outward to fully explicating the par-
ticular problems at hand.
Recasting ambivalence as a methodological heuristic
Contra Fassin, we assert that a more demanding methodology is achieved not by 
becoming more conscious and critical of our own moral presuppositions, but by 
cultivating ambivalence as an orientation to our work. Here the writings of the 
anthropologist Deana Jovanović and the political theorist Alena Ledeneva are 
instructive. 
Drawing on her fieldwork in Serbia, Jovanović (2016) has recently explicated 
the value of ambivalence as a means of understanding our interlocutors’ disposi-
tions and the myriad ambiguities and contradictions they experience in their lives. 
As she illustrates, people frequently hew to sets of dispositions that “cannot come 
into equilibrium with one another” (ibid.: 4) in their daily lives because of the so-
cial, political, and economic conditions in which they are embedded. 
It is these conditions which Ledeneva draws out in her writing on the ambiv-
alent future of Ukraine: making it something which has to be opened up, fully 
embraced, and explicated. Reflecting on contemporary political divisions in the 
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region, recently heightened by both Russian and European moves to remilitarize 
the “East”/“West” border, she states:
While “East” and “West” embark on another cycle of ideological 
confrontation and political standoff, there is little room left for marginal 
positions and ambivalent attitudes. . . . Yet paradoxically, exactly because 
it is impossible to achieve a consensus, and because the black-and-white 
forefront positions over the Crimea and east Ukraine split families, 
friendships, and international clubs, it is the understanding of grey areas 
. . . that might help define the way forward for Ukraine. (Ledeneva 2014a) 
Ledeneva (2006, 2014b) has also demonstrated the methodological and analytical 
significance of her orientation toward ambivalence in her studies of blat, or what 
she refers to as Soviet Russia’s “economy of favors.” Blat, as she describes it, is an 
informal, practical method for “getting things done” in the context of polarized 
constraint. Her explanation of this phenomenon is worth quoting at length:
The pervasiveness of blat turned favors into an alternative currency of 
“mutual help and mutual understanding” needed for the functioning 
of the non-market economy, and embodied people’s frustration 
with the non-consumerist ideology and political constraints of the 
centralized planning and distribution. On the individual level, favors 
delivered by friends, acquaintances, and friends of friends granted 
solutions to small-time problems. On a societal level, they represented 
a way out for the Soviet system that struggled to adhere to its own 
proclaimed principles. .  .  . The contradictory nature of constraints, 
and informal practices needed to resolve them, are well reflected in 
the anecdote about six paradoxes of socialism: No unemployment but 
nobody works; Nobody works but productivity increases; Productivity 
increases but shops are empty; Shops are empty but fridges are full; 
Fridges are full but nobody is satisfied; Nobody is satisfied but all vote 
unanimously. (Ledeneva 2014b: 15) 
Substantively, Ledeneva shows that each of these paradoxes masked its reference 
to an informal practice and in turn protected Soviet Russia’s claims to superiority, 
while undermining its principles. Methodologically, she shows that analytical dis-
tinctions (i.e., bipolarities, moral or otherwise) have little explanatory value outside 
of the informal practices which are, inevitably, nested within their constraints. It is 
engagement with everyday informal practices that permits us to see what is going 
on between the poles, and provides the conditions out of which polar accounts 
become stabilized. Bipolar accounts are, therefore, not descriptions of the world 
but an invitation to examine the conditions within which polarized descriptions 
are made meaningful. 
What Ledeneva makes clear is that ambivalence, by definition, presents us with 
an important methodological paradox. While it foregrounds polarized positions, 
their apparent clarity provides little help in dealing with the complexities of the 
social situation at hand, complexities which can only be understood when we resist 
the choice between positions which seek to deny them. Her own resistance to of-
fering intellectual or “moral” arbitration is of particular analytical interest, as is her 
refusal to advocate a step backward to offer a view beyond warring perspectives. 
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Instead, she steps forward into the murk and indeterminacy that polemics con-
ventionally mask and asks a very simple (anthropological) question: What is go-
ing on? Methodological ambivalence is, therefore, a call to explicate phenomena, 
to not take biopolarities for granted as simply descriptions of the way things are. 
An orientation toward ambivalence prevents the anthropologist from operating 
according to fixed positions which can distort his or her understanding of social 
phenomena. Ambivalence means that we have to accept that things are not read-
ily clear, that we need to learn about the conditions under which something may 
get called an abomination or not, and about how people come to take up variable 
positions. Following people who take sides isn’t a problem; position taking teaches 
us something fundamental about the nature of the world. It is when the researcher 
predicates his or her research on a side taken that problems arise.  
We would argue that this is even true—especially true—when conducting re-
search on those topics we find morally objectionable. Benjamin Teitelbaum (n.d.), 
an ethnomusicologist conducting research on radical nationalism in northern Eu-
rope, has some useful reflections on this point. He argues that if ethnographic re-
search is epistemologically rooted in a sense of rapport with those studied, then 
this commitment remains important even when the subjects of our research are the 
oppressors rather than the oppressed. As he notes, once our research is driven by “the 
imperative to goodness,” this effectively means that “we have endeavored to ensure 
that pieces of the human experience will remain for us a mystery.” 
Teitelbaum readily acknowledges that this morally uncommitted (he provoca-
tively calls it “immoral”) approach is not without its own ethical dilemmas, espe-
cially given that people often confuse academic interest and personal engagement 
with political sympathy. But in his view, the benefits of this orientation outweigh 
the risks. In his words,
I credit alignment with having improved appreciably my insight into a 
marginalized society that many discuss but few understand. By entering 
into reciprocal, collaborative, and affectionate relationships with 
Nordic radical nationalists I grew to occupy a position that was neither 
insider nor outsider, neither cheerleader nor opponent, and neither an 
accomplice nor an innocent. It was a position liminal in its ethics as well 
as in knowledge.
As Jonathan Turner suggests, “When concepts reflect moral biases, if not outrage, 
they almost always miss the point. They fail to denote key processes accurately; 
they lose precision and nuance” (2005: 33). In a sense, anthropologists, in our view, 
require an uncommitted—or at least an agnostic—stance on the “subjects” they 
study (in all senses of the word). Otherwise, these subjects will remain enigmas: 
interrogated but impenetrable; observed but not understood.
We contend that the need to cultivate ambivalence in our work has become 
even more urgent in the face of recent global events such as Brexit and the US 
election.4 On the surface, these events speak of increasingly divided and polarized 
4. Further afield, corollaries are to be found in the December 2016 vote in the Italian 
referendum, the 2015 election of a populist authoritarian government in Poland, and 
the consolidation of power by the government of Viktor Orban in Hungary (Gusterson 
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populations that appear to hold oppositional and mutually irreconcilable posi-
tions: conservative vs. liberal, prejudiced vs. progressive, closed vs. open, past- vs. 
future-oriented, and so on (Boyer 2016). However, to read the commitment of 
such positions at face value ignores the anomalies that start to pile up in the face of 
them. For example, to imagine that those who voted for Donald Trump (or Brexit) 
are “idiots,” “gullible,” or “xenophobes,” or as people wholeheartedly buying into a 
one-sided message, immediately starts to break down when we delve deeper into 
the compromised and paradoxical reasonings that lie at the heart of political deci-
sion making and indeed political campaigning (see Smelser 1997). Thus, we argue, 
such polarized positions are an invitation to unpick ambivalences rather than iron 
them out.5 
And yet it is hard to resist the temptation to give primacy to such events, as 
Veena Das (2006) might hold. The election of Trump, as is the case with the Brexit 
referendum, has been given a special type of authority, particularly by the media 
but also by anthropologists (see Forte 2016). Both events, Trump and Brexit, seem 
to exert a pressure upon us to take exclusive stances. This, however, may also be 
the moment when it is most important to resist the urge. Cultivating an analytic of 
ambivalence might be our best strategy for understanding what is going on—and 
arguably teaches us more about the character of social relations than a prefigured 
moral stance can.
By way of example, Jessica Smith (2017) discusses the popular diagnoses of Hill-
ary Clinton’s electoral defeat as the revenge of the white working-class or rural 
voter—part of a “new politics of resentment” (Cramer 2016). She suggests that ex-
planations for Trump’s victory which fall back on homogenized demographics may 
say more about the myopia of liberal politics and the distractions of a new “theater 
state” than about these particular voting blocs. She cautions that we need as com-
mentators and anthropologists to explore why we are all vulnerable, not just to 
Trump’s campaign, but to the tropes used to critique it. 
Brexit and the US election have prompted critical discussion among the an-
thropological community about how our own experiences and ideological leanings 
have shaped our responses. In this, Jeanette Edwards, Angelique Haugerud, and 
Shanti Parikh (2016) pose an important question: Would we have become so ex-
ercised about these events if Clinton had won or the 52 percent had voted instead 
to remain in the European Union? Taking up precisely this issue, contributors to 
the Social Anthropology forum “Brexit referendum: First reactions from anthro-
pology” (Green 2016) pushed many readers to consider precisely what aspects of 
the European Union they were mourning, particularly in the context of forms of 
austerity that have already had devastating consequences for those at the periphery 
2017). Marine Le Pen’s presidential run in France might have been added to that list 
but, in the light of recent results of parliamentary elections, it appears her party has flat-
lined. Given that this is due to Emmanuel Macron’s ascendancy on the back of a policy 
platform predicated on deregulation and labour market flexibility, the ambivalence ap-
pears again. 
5. The contradictions and complexities at the heart of Trump and Brexit have been sub-
jected to a range of recent debates within anthropology. As examples, see Edwards, 
Haugerud, and Parikh (2016); Green (2016); and Hall, Goldstein, and Ingram (2016).
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of European markets. Of course, our implication is not that anthropologists should 
avoid taking stances, but rather that these stances ought to be the outcome of ana-
lytical work and not precursors to it.
Conclusion
In this essay, we have made a case for reclaiming ambivalence as a valuable heu-
ristic device. Rather than treating it as a psychological “problem” to be “solved,” 
a negative of sorts, we argue that it serves an important methodological function 
because of the ways it destabilizes the very categories it is premised upon. Indeed, 
we have suggested that it was central to the professionalization of anthropology 
itself, which was built on an epistemological ambivalence regarding advocacy. It is 
precisely for this reason that the recent “moral turn” in the discipline has generated 
so much debate—not because of our disciplinary discomfort with morals (as Fassin 
would have it) but because of our ambivalent orientation to them. 
We don’t believe the problem of conflating anthropological interpretation and 
moral evaluation is resolved by collapsing morals and values and concluding that 
this is an inevitable feature of our work. In our view, this serves to simultaneously 
inflate the larger issue, by treating it as universal, and deflate its effects—whereby 
differences in kind are treated as that of degree and are dealt with via unreflexive 
calls to “be reflexive” (itself treated as both self-evident and a self-evident good). 
Instead, we have suggested that anthropologists should focus their attentions out-
ward rather than inward, cultivating a methodological ambivalence toward their 
subject matter that investigates polarities rather than taking them for granted as 
simply descriptions of the way things are. 
The agnosticism of ambivalence, particularly in the context of “taking sides,” does 
not let power—its forces or its effects—off the hook. Instead, it is a call for a more rig-
orous analysis, one which does not confuse a world of delimited stances for a world 
of significances. In this, we are reminded of Stanley Fish’s deliberations on the aca-
demic project in his book Save the world on your own time (2008). Perhaps best read 
as a provocative defense of higher education rather than as a denigration of political 
stance taking, Fish’s work cautions against assuming closed-off truths in favor of the 
analytical value of resisting and rejecting static textual readings of the world in which 
we live (Butin 2008). In our view, cultivating ambivalence in our research helps us to 
avoid such static interpretations of the world, despite their seductive power. 
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Cultiver l’ambivalence: quelques considérations méthodologiques pour 
l’anthropologie
L’ambivalence ressentie par les anthropologues par rapport à l’engagement poli-
tique a été, ces dernières années, le sujet de nombreuses critiques internes à la dis-
cipline - une transformation qui passe souvent pour un “tournant moral”. Cet essai 
est un plaidoyer pour l’ambivalence, qui montre ses apports à notre heuristique 
méthodologique. En retraçant l’histoire de ce concept, nous montrons que l’anthro-
pologie s’est fondée sur une ambivalence épistémologique en ce qui concerne son 
orientation face aux problèmes sociaux. Le tournant moral représente donc une 
transformation fondamentale dans la façon dont l’ethnographie est conçue. Bien 
que la possibilité de confusion entre évaluation morale et interprétation morale a 
été identifiée comme un danger de cette transformation, nous ne croyons pas que 
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ce problème peut être résolu en faisant simplement preuve de réflexivité, ni que 
tous les anthropologues en tiennent compte. Nous suggérons plutôt que cultiver 
une analytique fondée sur l’ambivalence est notre meilleure stratégie pour com-
prendre ce qui nous entoure, et elle nous apprend plus sur la nature des rapports 
sociaux que ce que nous pouvons espérer des positions morales pré-établies.
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